Federal Common Law Power to Remand a Properly Removed Case by Swing, Bradford Gram
FEDERAL COMMON LAW POWER TO REMAND A
PROPERLY REMOVED CASE
BRADFORD GRAM SWINGt
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789,1 Congress has enacted statutes
that grant federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions removed from
state court.2 These statutes empower federal courts to hear "Cases" 3
removed from state court the subject matter of which are encompassed
within Congress's limited grants of jurisdiction, usually cases "arising
under" federal law or cases within diversity jurisdiction.4 According to
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C Oh. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982). This provision states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil ac-
tion brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
Id. Without jurisdictional statutes the lower federal courts would be powerless to hear
cases. Article III states: "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested...
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The nine categories listed in article III, § 2 of the Constitu-
tion set the outer limits of federal court jurisdiction. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2;
Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 303 (1809); see also Insurance Corp.
of I. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) ("The character
of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in
Art. III, § 2, cl. 1."). But see National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337
U.S. 582, 600 (1949) (three-justice plurality holding that Congress under article I may
give justiciable controversies otherwise outside of article III to federal courts, "regard-
less of lack of diversity of citizenship"). By defining the authority of the lower federal
courts it creates, Congress may restrict jurisdiction more narrowly than does article III.
See Insurance Corp. of lr., 456 U.S. at 701 ("Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is
further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.").
' See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties . . ").
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). This provision states:
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizen-
ship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable
only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defend-
ants is a citizen of the state in which such action is brought.
Id. Since the first removal statute, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73,
79, statutes have provided for removal on the grounds of diversity of citizenship only to
parties who were not residents of the state where the suit was brought. This restriction
to nonresident defendants has appeared in every provision for diversity removal juris-
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the federal courts, removal jurisdiction can extend, just as original ju-
risdiction can extend, to a case that includes a state law claim closely
related to a federal law claim but that otherwise is not within the
court's statutory jurisdiction.' The boundaries of statutory removal ju-
risdiction and judicially-defined power over cases appear not wholly
congruent. This divide has caused conflict in defining the scope of fed-
eral judicial power over cases removed from state court.6
Consider, for example, a case initiated in state court that contains
transactionally-related claims arising under both federal and state law
and that the defendant properly removes to federal court. Section
1441(b) of the Judicial Code7 grants the district court jurisdiction over
the federal law claim. Common law jurisdiction attaches to the state
law claim because it and the federal law claim derive from a "common
nucleus of operative fact." 8 After removal, the court dismisses the fed-
eral law claim, and the district court judge decides that the state law
claim, although still within the court's incidental jurisdiction,' should
diction except one. The exception is the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
For the text of the 1875 statute, see infra note 156. The Judiciary Act of 1887, ch.
373, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Judiciary Act of 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433, again
limited removal to nonresident defendants. Therefore, with the exception of references
pertaining to the 1875 Act, any reference in this Comment to a party removing a diver-
sity case to federal court, whether to a plaintiff or to a defendant, should be understood
to mean a nonresident party.
I See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court refers to such
a state law claim as a "nonfederal claim": "[T]he term 'nonfederal claim' means one as
to which there is no independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Conversely, a 'federal
claim' means one as to which an independent basis for federal jurisdiction exists."
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.11 (1978). A nonfederal
claim can be a state law claim between co-citizens that is closely related to a claim
between diverse citizens or a state law claim that is closely related to a claim arising
under federal law. See infra note 9.
8 For discussion of the conflict in defining the scope of federal judicial power over
cases in a court's original jurisdiction, see infra notes 31-66 and accompanying text.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). For the text of the statute, see supra note 4.
8 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). For discussion of the
statutory limits on the exercise of common law jurisdiction over state law claims, see
infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
' This Comment will use the term "incidental" jurisdiction instead of the tradi-
tional terms "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction. Using the Supreme Court's current
terminology, this hypothetical state law claim is within the court's pendent jurisdiction.
Pendent jurisdiction "concerns the resolution of a plaintiff's federal- and state-law
claims against a single defendant in one action." Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370. Ancillary
jurisdiction, by comparison, "typically involves claims by a defending party haled into
court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost
unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court." Id. at 376. The
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over nonfederal claims often has been upheld in situa-
tions involving impleader, cross-claims, or counterclaims. See id. at 375. Both pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction are judicial doctrines that permit a federal court to exercise
jurisdiction over a party or claim normally not within the scope of federal judicial
power. See Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules
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be decided in state court."0 The statute, i" however, apparently only au-
thorizes the judge to remand cases removed "improvidently and without
jurisdiction." 12 Whether the statute limits the district judge's power to
and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV.
1399, 1401 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter "One Constitutional Case"].
Distinctions between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction have caused confusion and
criticism. See Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 974 (2d Cir. 1944) (criticiz-
ing ancillary jurisdiction as "amorphous"). See generally Matasar, A Pendent and An-
cillary Jurisdiction Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17
U.C. DAVis L. REV. 103, 105%(1983) [hereinafter Jurisdiction Primer] (describing in-
cidental, or "supplemental," jurisdiction decisions as "shrouded in mystery"). A better
view is that the two doctrines describe categories of incidental jurisdiction. See id. (pen-
dent and ancillary labels "at least at their core, describe the same thing"). See generally
Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Inci-
dental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935, 1936 (1982) (defining incidental jurisdic-
tion as the power of a federal court to "decide in one case matters that, if presented
separately, would be jurisdictionally insufficient because of lack of diversity of citizen-
ship or failure to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement"). Although the Su-
preme Court has not analyzed judicial power over state law claims in terms of a gen-
eral incidental jurisdiction, neither has it found it "necessary to determine ...
'whether there are any "principled" differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdic-
tion. . . .'" Kroger, 437 U.S. at 370 n.8 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13
(1976)). Moreover, the Court has recognized that pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are
"two species of the same generic problem: Under what circumstances may a federal
court hear and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same State?" Id.
at 370.
"0 Jurisdiction over a properly removed state law claim is not lost after all federal
law claims have been dismissed. See Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir.
1983); Rotermund v. United States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1141 (8th Cir. 1973);
Brough v. United Steel Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 437 F.2d 748, 750 (1st Cir. 1971);
Murphy v. Kodz, 351 F.2d 163, 167 (9th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Eastern States Corp.,
181 F.2d 26, 28-29 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 864 (1950); 1A J. MOORE & B.
RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.160[7] (1987).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
12 Id. Two statutory provisions authorize remand after removal, neither of which
is applicable to this case. The first states in part: "If at any time before final judgment
it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district
court shall remand the case . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). The term "improvi-
dently" generally refers to failure of the removing party to satisfy a statutory, nonjuris-
dictional requirement for removal, such as the posting of a bond or removing within
thirty days of the service of the initial pleading. See In re Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 587 F.2d 642, 645-47 & nn.3 & 8 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Note, Remand Order
Review After Thermtron Products, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1086, 1093 (1977) (statutory
term "improvidently" refers to legally defective or untimely removal petition). The hy-
pothetical assumes that all such requirements have been satisfied. The term "without
jurisdiction" is likewise inapplicable as the case was properly removed and is within
the court's jurisdiction.
The second statutory provision states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more other-
wise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be re-
moved and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise within its original
jurisdiction.
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remand a case that was properly removed, but that in its present pos-
ture contains only state law claims, is a question that divides the courts
of appeals,'" a conflict that the Supreme Court has agreed to resolve. 4
This Comment will assess two views of jurisdictional author-
ity-one based strictly on statute, the other relying on a claim of
residual power to fashion common law-that conflict in defining the
power to remand a properly removed case. Part I introduces the statu-
tory bases for removal jurisdiction and examines the expansion of its
scope through the development of incidental jurisdiction. It then sets
forth the conflict between a federal court's statutorily-defined power to
remand cases and its common law power over incidental state law
claims. Part II explores judicial power to decline vested jurisdiction, as
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982). Claims that derive from a "common nucleus of operative
fact," Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, are not "separate and independent" for the purposes of
§ 1441(c). See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951) (holding
that "where there is a single wrong to plaintiff . . . arising from an interlocked series
of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under
§ 1441(c)").
Federal jurisdiction over state law claims under § 1441(c) is another example of a
district court's incidental jurisdiction. See supra note 9. Along with pendent and ancil-
lary claims, such claims are a third species of the "generic problem" that the Supreme
Court identified in Kroger: "Under what circumstances may a federal court hear and
decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same state?" Kroger, 437 U.S.
at 370. State law claims under § 1441(c), however, cannot formally be classified as
either pendent or ancillary. As noted above, a pendent claim as defined in Gibbs cannot
be "separate and independent" from an otherwise removable claim. Nor can a state law
claim that a plaintiff joins with a federally cognizable claim satisfy the Supreme
Court's analysis of ancillary jurisdiction. See supra note 9. For further discussion of
federal jurisdiction over state law claims under § 1441(c), see infra notes 140-55 and
accompanying text.
13 See infra note 74.-
See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 1986), granting mandamus in Boyle v.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and reh'g
granted, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888, (3d Cir. Sept.
24, 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, No. 85-3619, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 13,
1986) (en banc), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1283 (1987). In this case, a husband and
wife brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylva-
nia, complaining of the husband's employment termination. They alleged causes of ac-
tion against his employer under various theories of tort and contract, as well as viola-
tions of state and federal age discrimination laws. Relying on the plaintiffs' federal age
discrimination claim, the defendant removed the action to federal court. After discovery
disclosed that the husband had never filed an age discrimination charge with a federal
or state agency, a prerequisite for suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d), 633(b) (1982), the plaintiffs moved to amend their com-
plaint to delete the federal claim and to remand the remaining state law claims to state
court. The district judge granted the motion. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit granted the defendant's petition for mandamus and directed the district
court to vacate its remand order. The court sitting en banc, however, vacated the writ
and reheard the case. By an equally divided vote, it denied the petition, providing a
view in microcosm of the conflict concerning the power to remand that divides the
courts of appeals. See infra note 74.
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well as issues involving the separation of powers under the Constitu-
tion. Part III examines the history of removal statutes to argue that
Congress's purpose in enacting removal statutes does not limit a federal
court from exercising its common law authority over incidental claims.
Finally, Part IV argues that a federal court's common law authority
includes the power to remand and that the justifications for incidental
jurisdiction-judicial economy, efficiency, and fairness to liti-
gants-support discretionary remand of state law claims in certain
cases.
I. THE SCOPE OF REMOVAL JURISDICTION
Determining whether a federal court has removal jurisdiction over
a simple case that contains a single claim is a relatively straightforward
matter. Either the case comes within the limits of article III and the
accompanying jurisdictional statutes or it does not. With modern devel-
opments in procedural rules, however, the scope of cases for which re-
moval is sought has greatly expanded. This Part examines the conflict
between the statute that provides for limited removal jurisdiction and a
federal court's power to hear cases removed from state court that in-
clude claims both within and without those limits.
A. The Statutory Bases for Removal
The Constitution makes no mention of removal, nor was the pro-
cedure known at common law;1 5 yet, statutes have provided for removal
jurisdiction since Congress first established lower federal courts. 6 The
constitutionality of removal has long been settled.
17
The Judiciary Act of 178918 provided a right to remove to nonresi-
dent defendants in diversity actions and to a party in a land title suit
who claimed title under a grant from a state other than that in which
the suit was pending. 9 Before the Civil War, Congress expanded re-
15 See IA J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, supra note 10, 1 0.157[1.-1l]; C. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 206 (4th ed. 1983).
6 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79.
17 See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 267 (1879); Railway Co. v. Whitton, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 287-90 (1871); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) (stating that the Constitution implicitly sanctions removal).
18 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
19 Id. at § 12, 1 Stat. at 79. Section 12 stipulated that civil cases could be removed
before trial in state courts by a nonresident or alien defendant if the jurisdictional
amount, then $500, was satisfied. See id. Jurisdiction over land title disputes also re-
quired that a $500 jurisdictional amount be met. This provision permitted either party
to remove. See id., 1 Stat. at 80.
The Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92, granted general federal
1987]
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moval jurisdiction, but only when needed to enforce particular federal
laws.2" During the War and Reconstruction, however, Congress passed
many statutes containing removal provisions,"' some of which made a
federal forum available to many state court defendants who previously
had not been within the scope of removal jurisdiction.22 Removal juris-
diction reached its height in 1875 with legislation that permitted re-
moval by either plaintiffs or defendants of virtually all cases within the
judicial power of article III, subject only to an amount in controversy
requirement.23 Congress narrowed access to federal court in 1887 with
a statute limiting the right to remove to defendants.24 The present re-
moval statute2 5 is closely derived from the 1887 legislation.26
question jurisdiction, which broadened federal court power to hear cases removed from
state court. It was repealed during the Jefferson Administration. See Act of Mar. 8,
1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132; S. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLIT-
ics 145 (1968).
20 See Nonintercourse Act of 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198-99, reenacted by
Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 6, 3 Stat. 231, 233-34 (removal, irrespective of diversity
or the amount in controversy requirement, was available "for any thing done, or omit-
ted to be done as an officer of the customs, or for any thing done by virtue of this act
.... "); Force Act of 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633-34 (permitting removal of
suits involving "any right, authority, or title," under any federal revenue statute).
2 Congress passed twelve removal provisions during this period. See S. KUTLER,
supra note 19, at 147; see, e.g., Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755,
756-57 (allowing federal officers or any other person to remove cases against them for
wrongs done under authority of the President or federal law, even after judgment); Act
of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 3, 14 Stat. 46, 46 (reaffirming removal rights granted by
Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 and dispensing with the requirement that defendants give
surety to state courts upon removal); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 16, 16 Stat. 433,
438-39 (allowing anyone prosecuted in state court for acts done under the provisions of
the Act to seek removal; allowing removal to be based on counsel's certification that the
facts presented in the petition were true; voiding state court proceedings subsequent to
removal; and establishing that any attempt to prosecute the case in state court subse-
quent to removal was a federal misdemeanor), repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25,
28 Stat. 36. See generally S. KUTLER, supra note 19, at 145-60 (discussing removal
jurisdiction during Reconstruction).
22 See, e.g., The Separable Controversy Act of 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (al-
lowing an out-of-state defendant, joined with in-state defendants, to remove case from
state court for "final determination of the controversy, so far as it concerns him, with-
out the presence of the other defendants"); Prejudice or Local Influence Act of 1867,
ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558 (providing for removal when defendant filed an affidavit in state
court stating that he had reason and did believe he could not obtain justice in state
court). For a discussion of the 1866 and 1867 Acts, see infra notes 140-52 and accom-
panying text.
2 See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470; infra notes 153-62 and accom-
panying text.
24 See Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Judiciary Act of
1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433; infra notes 163-82 and accompanying text.
2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1447 (1982).
26 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 209. The 1948 Revision to the Judicial
Code made important changes to the removal statute. Although the basic structure of
removal jurisdiction remains unchanged since the 1887 statute, the reenactment recast
aspects of Congress's purpose for enacting removal statutes. See H.R. REP. No. 308,
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The scope of removal jurisdiction over federal questions is related
to the scope of original jurisdiction. Both sections 13312" and 1441(b)2"
empower the court to hear cases "arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States."2" This relationship between original
and removal jurisdiction is rooted in history. It was not until 1875, the
same year that Congress expanded removal jurisdiction, that Congress
exercised its article III authority to give federal courts general federal
question jurisdiction. 0
B. Exercising Incidental Jurisdiction
In a small number of cases from the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, federal courts exercised jurisdiction over incidental state
law claims joined with federal law claims.31 With the promulgation of
80th Cong., 1st Sess., Reviser's Notes (1947), reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (West
1973) [hereinafter Reviser's Notes] (accompanying the revision bill, H.R. 3214, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 4115 (1947)). For a discussion of the importance of
these changes in legislative purpose, see infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
27 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
2- 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982); cf 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) ("arising under the
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States").
" See Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470. Judicial interpreta-
tions of §§1331 and 1441(b) acknowledge this textual and historical relationship:
Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted the statutory phrase
'arising under . . . ' has resisted all attempts to frame a single, precise
definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases fall
outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts. Especially when
considered in light of § 1441's removal jurisdiction, the phrase "arising
under" masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and
state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system.
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983)
(citations omitted).
31 Chief Justice Marshall, in Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824), stated what is thought to be the earliest exposition of the power to
hear incidental claims:
We think . . . when a question to which the judicial power of the Union
is extended by the constitution[] forms an ingredient of the original cause,
it is the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that
cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823.
The first noteworthy application of this judicial power occurred in Siler v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). In that case, a state law claim was inciden-
tal to a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute. The Supreme Court, avoid-
ing the constitutional question, held that the circuit court could properly adjudicate the
state law claim. Although the use of incidental jurisdiction to avoid constitutional adju-
dication limited the holding, the Court in Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 243 (1933),
relied on Siler to articulate broader bases for incidental jurisdiction. In Hum, the
Court exercised incidental jurisdiction to hear a patent infringement claim brought with
a state claim based on unfair competition. For more discussion of Hurn, see infra note
1987]
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,32 however, the number
of such cases increased dramatically.33 Before promulgation of the Fed-
eral Rules, federal litigants were required to follow state procedures in
actions at law3 4 and the Federal Equity Rules in actions in equity.3 5
After the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merged law and equity, 8
state procedures derived from equity that permitted more liberal join-
der 7 became the norm for all federal actions.38 As federal courts exer-
cised incidental jurisdiction in a greater number of cases, the scope of
original, and hence of removal, jurisdiction expanded.3 9
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,4 the Supreme Court redefined
the test for incidental jurisdiction to reflect changes effected by the
Rules.41 It construed article III to define the outer limits42 of a dis-
trict court's authority to hear state law claims closely related to a
substantial federal law claim within the court's original jurisdic-
46. See generally Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 114-22 (discussing the history
of incidental jurisdiction from Osborn to Hum).
32 See 308 U.S. 645 (1939).
33 See Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28
STAN. L. REv. 395, 416-21 (1976).
31 See Practice Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
35 See Equity Rules of 1912, 226 U.S. 627, 627-73 (1912).
36 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909,
961-75 (1987).
17The Equity Rules permitted the joinder of claims and parties more liberally
than did most state rules for practice in actions at law. See Goldberg, supra note 33, at
416 n.112.
8 The Rules permit joinder of all claims one party has against an opposing party.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Plaintiffs may also join several defendants or join with
others as multiple plaintiffs. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). Other rules permit counter-
claims of all kinds against opposing parties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a)-(b), and other
expansive joinders; see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) (cross-claims), 13(h) (addition of
new parties to cross-claims), 14 (impleader), 22 (interpleader), 24 (intervention).
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 82 states in part: "These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
therein." The widely accepted explanation for the expansion of the incidental jurisdic-
tion of federal courts with the liberal joinder rules of the Federal Rules has been the
notion of "dormant jurisdiction." According to this view, the new Rules merely enabled
courts to apply preexisting jurisdictional concepts to more broadly-defined actions. See
Goldberg, supra note 33, at 417. For an argument that these procedural reforms cre-
ated the need for more expansive jurisdiction to match the greater reach of the new
joinder provisions, see id. at 416-21.
40 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
"I See id. at 724-27.
42 In Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978), the
Court interpreted Gibbs to have "delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial
power."
43 Before a court can exercise incidental jurisdiction, it must find that a federal
law claim in the case has "substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on
the court." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725; see Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933),
(when "the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance" the court can
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tion."" In marking the limits of that power under article III, the Court
held that "[tihe state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact."'4 5 This formulation replaced the test devel-
oped before the unification of law and equity, which permitted the ex-
ercise of federal jurisdiction over both state law and federal law claims
when they were found to be "two distinct grounds in support of a sin-
gle cause of action."4, 6 By focusing on the facts giving rise to plaintiff's
exercise incidental jurisdiction). Because Gibbs and its progeny, see infra notes 48-58,
indicate that the judicial power to hear incidental claims is constitutional, the substanti-
ality component of incidental jurisdiction is assumed to have its source in the Constitu-
tion. See "One Constitutional Case," supra note 9, at 1417; see also infra notes 48-58
and accompanying text (discussing the statutory component of incidental jurisdiction
articulated after Gibbs). For an argument that the source of the substantiality require-
ment of incidental jurisdiction is statutory, see "One Constitutional Case," supra note
9, at 1432-38. Whether constitutional or statutory, the general "substantial federal
question" doctrine, to which the substantiality component of incidental jurisdiction is
related, emerged as courts interpreted the grant of federal question jurisdiction in the
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472. See infra notes 156-59 and
accompanying text (discussing the 1875 Act and arguing that it demonstrates Con-
gress's intent that a federal court have power to remand a case that was not of substan-
tial federal character).
" See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
" Id. at 725. The Court also stated: "Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial
power, exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties . . . ,' and the relationship between . . . [the federal]
claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional 'case.'" Id.
The jurisprudence of incidental jurisdiction is an example of federal common law.
See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973) (defining fed-
eral common law to mean "rules of decision where the authority . . . is not explicitly
or clearly found in federal statutory or constitutional command"); Merrill, The Com-
mon Law Power of the Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (defining
federal common law to mean "any federal rule of decision that is not mandated on the
face of some authoritative federal text"). The Court has given this description of the
jurisprudence of incidental jurisdiction:
Gibbs and its lineal ancestor Osborn [v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); see infra note 31] were couched in terms of
Art. III's grant of judicial power in "Cases . . .arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and [its] treaties," since they ...
represented inquiries into the scope of Art. III jurisdiction in litigation
where the "common nucleus of operative fact" gave rise to non-federal
questions of claims between parties. None of them posed the need for a
further inquiry into the underlying statutory grant of federal jurisdiction
or a flexible analysis of concepts such as "question," "claim," and "cause
of action," because Congress had not addressed itself by statute to this
matter. In short, Congress had said nothing about the scope of "Cases" in
Art. III which would offer guidance on the kind of elusive question ad-
dressed in Osborn and Gibbs: whether and to what extent jurisdiction ex-
tended to a parallel state claim against the existing federal defendant.
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1976).
48 Hum, 289 U.S. at 246. The Hum test contrasted
a case where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are
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claims, instead of on conflicting legal definitions of a "cause of action,"
the Gibbs test made incidental jurisdiction more readily applicable to
state law claims.47
Since Gibbs, the Court has made clear that determining the federal
court's "[c]onstitutional power" 48 to hear a state law claim is only the
alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and a case where
two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of which is
federal in character. In the former, where the question averred is not
plainly wanting in substance, the federal court, even though the federal
ground be not established may nevertheless retain and dispose of the cause
upon the non-federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the non-
federal cause of action.
Id. In Hum, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin performance of a play called "The Spider,"
alleging that it infringed upon their copyrighted play, "The Evil Hour." Plaintiffs also
alleged that performance of "The Spider" constituted unfair competition under state
law with respect to both the copyrighted version and a revised uncopyrighted version of
"The Evil Hour." The Court held that there was judicial power to determine the un-
fair competition claim with respect to the copyrighted version of the plaintiffs' play but
not as to the uncopyrighted version: "The bill . . . sets forth facts alleged to be in
violation of two distinct rights, namely, the right to the protection of the copyrighted
play, and the right to the protection of the uncopyrighted play." Id. at 248. Although
the concept of a "cause of action" was reformed by the adoption of the federal rules and
the unification of law and equity, see supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text, until
Gibbs the test for incidental jurisdiction was tied to the old terminology. By keeping the
cause of action test, the Court effectively authorized incidental jurisdiction only when a
plaintiff sought to add a state law claim that was virtually identical to a federal law
claim in the action. See "One Constitutional Case," supra note 9, at 1413. The Court
in Gibbs found this test for jurisdiction by categories to be "unnecessarily grudging."
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
"' In a footnote, the Court commented on the relationship between the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its reformulation of the test for incidental
jurisdiction: "While it is commonplace that the Federal Rules . . . do not expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts, they do embody 'the whole tendency of our decisions...
to require a plaintiff to try his . . . whole case at one time,' Baltimore S.S. Co. v.
Phillips, [274 U.S. 316, 320 (1921),] and to that extent emphasize the basis of pendent
jurisdiction." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 n.13. Earlier in the opinion, discussing the cause
of action test of Hum, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, the Court quoted
Baltimore S.S. Co. at length to illustrate "a case in which 'cause of action' had been
used to identify the operative scope of the doctrine of resjudicata." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at
723. The Court in Baltimore S.S. Co. had stated:
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful viola-
tion of a right which the facts show. The number and variety of the facts
alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as their
result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the vio-
lation of but one right by a single legal wrong.
Baltimore S.S. Co., 274 U.S. at 321, quoted in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 723. Commenting on
Hurns's citation of Baltimore S.S. Co., the Court stated "that the weighty policies of
judicial economy and fairness to parties reflected in the res judicata doctrine were in
themselves strong counsel for the adoption of a rule which would permit federal courts
to dispose of the state as well as the federal claims." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. For
discussion of the claim preclusive implications of incidental jurisdiction, se Jurisdiction
Primer, supra note 9, at 111-14 & n.40.
8 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
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beginning of the jurisdictional analysis. Jurisdiction over incidental
claims is limited not only by the provisions of article III, but also by
statutes."9 In Aldinger v. Howard,50 the Court held that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over a state law claim, although it shared a
"common nucleus of operative fact" with a federal law claim.5" The
plaintiff's federal law claim against county officials arose under section
1983.52 The Court reasoned that under the then-prevailing interpreta-
tion of section 198383 jurisdiction over the state law claim against the
county was barred because Congress had not intended a county to be
subject to suit under the statute.54 Similarly, in Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,55 the Court held that the complete diversity
requirement 56 of section 133257 barred the district court from exercising
incidental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim against a non-diverse
third-party defendant, although that claim satisfied the Gibbs test.5
Both Aldinger and Kroger involved attempts to apply the Gibbs
test to a nonfederal claim against a party not within original federal
court jurisdiction. Gibbs, by contrast, involved jurisdiction over a
nonfederal claim between parties already properly in federal court.
Whether the Court's inquiry into statutory limits in Aldinger and Kro-
ger constructs a test that extends beyond cases involving new parties is
not clear.59 This Comment adopts a broad interpretation of these hold-
ings and will assume that in any exercise of incidental jurisdiction "a
court must attempt to discern the express or implied intent of
49 Id. at 372-73 & n.12.
50 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
51 See id. at 16-17.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
53 Municipal corporations have since been held to be amenable to suit under
§ 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
" See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
55 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
51 See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982).
58 See Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373-75. The Court stated:
Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of the
posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute
that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to determine
whether 'Congress in [that statute] has ...expressly or by implication
negated' the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal claim.
Id. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18). A statutory limitation on the exercise of
incidental jurisdiction is evident in Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301
(1973). The Court in Zahn held that in a diversity class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) the claim of each member must satisfy the amount in contro-
versy requirement set by § 1332(a). It implicitly rejected the argument that those
claims that did not satisfy the requirement were "ancillary" to those that did. See
Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301.
59 See Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 167.
19871
594 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Congress."60
Cases defining incidental jurisdiction-Gibbs, Aldinger, and Kro-
ger-have addressed the threshold question of incidental jurisdiction:
whether a federal court in its original jurisdiction initially has power to
hear a state law claim. This issue is ordinarily resolved on the plead-
ings.61 Federal court jurisdiction over an incidental claim, however, is
not a party's right. 2 After a district court determines that a claim is
within its constitutional power and that jurisdiction over that claim is
not limited by any statute, whether the court will hear and decide the
claim is within the judge's discretion.63 The Supreme Court instructs
the judge to consider "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
litigants .... "64 If the federal claim is insubstantial or is dismissed
before trial, the court ordinarily should dismiss the state law claims
without prejudice. 65 Considerations of federalism and comity should
also guide the district judge's discretion. To avoid unnecessary adjudi-
cations of state law, federal courts should defer to the state courts' com-
petence to decide questions of state law.
66
With a properly removed case that contains only incidental claims,
however, the court must address its power to dispose of a state law
claim already within its jurisdiction. Although the court would have
judicial power to decide a remaining incidental claim,6 7 it would, for
the reasons enunciated in Gibbs,"8 most likely exercise its discretion not
60 See id. The commentator continues:
All federal jurisdiction is subject both to constitutional and congressional
jurisdictional grants. For a court to ignore congressional intent is inconsis-
tent with our governmental system, which separates legislative and judicial
power. Congress is the branch that controls the jurisdiction of such courts.
Hence, even in Gibbs-type cases, courts must search for congressional
intent.
Id. at 167-68.
61 See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. In the context of removal, this issue is resolved at
the time the defendant petitions the district court for removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)
(1982) (petition shall contain "a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle
him ...to removal together with a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served
upon him . . . in such action").




86 See id. & n.15.
17 See supra note 10 (citing cases). A federal court, following Gibbs, would also
have power to dismiss the incidental claims. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
es In the context of original jurisdiction, the Court in Gibbs described the con-
stancy of a court's discretion over incidental claims:
The question of power will ordinarily be resolved on the pleadings. But
the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has been properly assumed is one
which remains open throughout the litigation. Pretrial procedures or even
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to hear the claim. Before the court can exercise its discretion and re-
mand the case, however, it must determine the scope of section
1447(c).69 Because the exercise of incidental jurisdiction is limited by
both article III and statutes, the court must decide whether section
1447(c) limits its power to remand.
C. The Conflict over the Power to Remand a Properly Removed
Case
Although the Supreme Court has not precisely defined the district
courts' power to remand a properly removed case, the Court has had
opportunity, by way of petitions for mandamus, to police the exercise of
the district courts' power to remand. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v.
Hermansdorfer,0 the Court determined that mandamus should lie to
compel the district judge not to remand a case properly removed to his
court. 1 The judge acknowledged that his reason for remanding was not
one stated in the statute but determined that he had the discretion to
remand the case to state court. His stated reason was that the district
court's crowded docket would deny plaintiff speedy relief; litigation in
state court would be faster.7 2 The Supreme Court intervened: "Because
the District Judge remanded a properly removed case on grounds that
he had no authority to consider, he exceeded his statutorily defined
power; and issuance of the writ of mandamus was not barred by
§ 1447(d)." 73
The courts of appeals have divided in interpreting Thermtron.
the trial itself may reveal a substantial hegemony of state law claims, or
likelihood of jury confusion, which could not have been anticipated at the
pleading stage. Although it will of course be appropriate to take account
in this circumstance of the already completed course of the litigation, dis-
missal of the state claim might even then be merited. For example, it may
appear that the plaintiff was well aware of the nature of his proofs and
the relative importance of his claims; recognition of a federal court's wide
latitude to decide ancillary questions of state law does not imply that it
must tolerate a litigant's effort to impose upon it what is in effect only a
state case. Once it appears that a state claim constitutes the real body of a
case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage, the state claim may
fairly be dismissed.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
70 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
71 See id. at 351.
72 See id. at 340-41 & nn.3-4.
73 Id. at 351. For discussion of why mandamus was not barred in Thermtron, see
infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
7 Some circuits have interpreted the holding in Thermtron broadly as barring a
district court from remanding a properly removed case for reasons not stated in the
statute. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. Seay, 696 F.2d 780, 782 (10th
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Some courts have reasoned that the "ground he had no authority to
consider" language75 in the first clause of its holding relates to the spe-
cific facts of Thermtron.76 The district judge's action was egregious,
and mandamus should have issued in that case. But, these courts con-
tinue, the second clause does not foreclose the existence of authority to
remand on other grounds not mentioned in the statute.77 A court with
power to hear state law claims may dismiss them in the exercise of its
discretion. In the removal context, this view concludes, a district court
likewise has authority to remand state law claims.
7 18
Other courts have given broad scope to Thermtron, reading the
grant of the writ of mandamus in that case as a prohibition against all
discretionary remands.7 ' These courts found an inconsistency between
Cir. 1983) (under the standards of Thermtron, mandamus relief is proper because the
order of remand was issued on grounds unauthorized by the statutes); Levy v. Weiss-
man, 671 F.2d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 1982) (same); Ryan v. State Bd. of Elections, 661
F.2d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); see also Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909
(7th Cir. 1983) (stating, without citing Thermtron, that "remand of removed cases
must be based on specific statutory authority").
The Fifth Circuit initially held against any nonstatutory remand. See, e.g., In re
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 598 F.2d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[Pllaintiff cannot pre-
cipitate a remand of the action by amending the complaint to eliminate the federal
claim." (quoting 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3722 (1982))); In re Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 587 F.2d 642,
644-45 (5th Cir. 1978) (mandamus appropriate when a "district court enters a remand
order that is not only erroneous but also states that it is based on nonstatutory
grounds"). The Fifth Circuit, however, has reversed its course. See IMFC Professional
Servs. of Fla., Inc. v. Latin Am. Home Health, Inc., 676 F.2d 152, 160 (5th Cir. Unit
B 1982) (A district court has "independent authority for a discretion to remand [which
is derived] from the nature of the ancillary jurisdiction created by § 1442(a)(1).").
Other circuits hold that incidental jurisdiction provides legitimate authority on
which to ground a decision to remand. See In re Romulus Community Schools, 729
F.2d 431, 440 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding decision to remand where "judicial economy
and the presence of unresolved issues of state law strongly support[ed] the district
court's decision to remand"); see also Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 89-90 & n.4 (4th Cir.
1983) (determining, without discussing or citing Thermtron, that the court, in its dis-
cretion, could remand a properly removed incidental claim); Hofbauer v. Northwestern
Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1197, 1207 (8th Cir. 1983) (same); Naylor v. Case & McGrath,
Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 561-63 (2d Cir. 1978) (when state law is unsettled, district court
should abstain through remand to state court).
75 Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
" See Romulus, 729 F.2d at 436 ("The Supreme Court's forceful pronounce-
ments in Thermtron against remands unauthorized by statute were prompted by the
extreme circumstances of that case.").
77 See IMFC, 676 F.2d at 159-60. Judge Godbold wrote, "Thermtron does not
hold . . . that there can never be an element of discretion in the remand process.
Rather, discretion to remand is not prohibited by § 1447(c)-or Thermtron if that dis-
cretion is based on clearly articulated authority." Id. (footnote omitted).
78 See Romulus, 729 F.2d at 436-40.
79 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, No. 85-3619, slip op. at 13, 41 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046, 1051 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 1986), granting mandamus in
Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and
reh'g granted, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (3d Cir.
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the power to remand for reasons not specified in the statute and the
"fundamental constitutional principle that the jurisdiction of the infer-
ior federal courts is dependent on specific statutory authorization."80
According to this view, the established rule that removal statutes should
be strictly construed8" does not permit remand on nonstatutory grounds.
The removal statutes direct when a district judge "shall" remand a
case 82 and when in her discretion she "may" remand a case.83 Those
who invoke the "fundamental constitutional principle" argue that this
statutory scheme forecloses exercising discretion not authorized by
statute.84
II. THE POWER TO DECLINE VESTED JURISDICTION AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
To those who read the holding in Thermtron Products v.
Hermansdorfer85 broadly, discretionary remand of a properly removed
case violates the separation of powers.86 Proponents of this view argue
that, after a case has been removed to federal court, the power to re-
mand is dependent on the specific terms of section 1447(c). 87 A judge
who remands a case for reasons not mentioned in that provision-even
a case that in its present posture contains only state law
Sept. 24, 1986), affd by an equally divided court, No. 85-3619, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov.
13, 1986) (en banc), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1283 (1987); Levy v. Weissman, 671
F.2d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 1982); Ryan v. State Bd. of Elections, 661 F.2d 1130, 1134 (7th
Cir. 1981). The provision governing remand states that if "it appears that the case was
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the
case," 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). These courts evidently read this language affirma-
tively to prohibit the remand of any properly removed case.
80 Cohill, slip op. at 13, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1051.
81 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941).
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
83 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
84 See Cohill, slip op. at 13, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1051.
85 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
8 See Cohill, slip op. at 13, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1051.
87 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982). As with incidental claims outside of the removal
context, the district judge could in her discretion dismiss without prejudice a case con-
taining only state law claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-
27 (1966); cf. Cook v. Weber, 698 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1983) ("In exercise of its
sound discretion the court may retain pendent jurisdiction of the state claim, even if the
federal claim which served as the basis for removal was dismissed."). The difference
between dismissal and remand of state law claims becomes crucial in those states with-
out a savings clause in their statute of limitations. See In re Romulus Community
Schools, 729 F.2d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 1984). For further discussion, see infra notes 204-
07 and accompanying text. At this stage of the analysis, however, the issue is whether a
district court has the power to remand properly removed cases at all, not whether the
availability of remand would be more fair to plaintiffs whose state law claims would
otherwise be barred by the running of the statute of limitations.
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claims-confronts the assertion that lower federal courts are dutybound
to hear cases within their statutorily-conferred power."8
A. Analogy to Abstention
Federal courts often decline to exercise jurisdiction over cases
within their power, despite statements of countervailing duty, by invok-
ing the doctrine of abstention. Abstention is a collection of judicially-
developed doctrines,"9 some of which require9" and others of which
counsel91 that federal courts defer to pending or potential state court
proceedings. Abstention results either in a stay92 or dismissal93 of the
federal actions. To counter objections based on the duty to exercise
vested jurisdiction, judges have developed rationales to justify the doc-
trine similar to those developed for declining incidental jurisdiction:
considerations of federalism, comity, and judicial efficiency.94 The prac-
88 Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821), is often cited: "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution." Id. at 404. More recently, Justice Brennan stated that
federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976).
8 81 According to one authority, these are: 1) Pullman abstention, used to avoid
decision of a federal constitutional question if the case may be disposed of on state law
grounds (from Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941)); 2) Bur-
ford abstention, used to avoid needless conflict with a state's administration of its own
affairs (from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18 (1943)); 3) abstention used
to leave to a state the resolution of an unsettled question of state law; and 4) abstention
used to avoid duplicative litigation. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 74, § 4241.
80 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (holding that principles
of equity, comity, and federalism require a federal court to abstain from enjoining state
court proceedings, absent a showing of bad faith prosecution, where a plaintiff in fed-
eral court challenges the constitutionality of a criminal statute under which the state is
prosecuting the federal plaintiff).
81 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501; see also County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959) (abstention is appropriate "in cases presenting
a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture
by a state court determination of pertinent state law").
82 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31
(1959); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
11 See, e.g., Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1975);
Burford, 319 U.S. at 334.
" See Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEo.
L.J. 99, 103-04 & n.18 (1986). The rationales usually given for Pullman and Burford
abstention are federalism and comity-the need for federal courts to abstain where state
remedies are available and federal intervention could create friction between the federal
and state systems. See Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60
N.C.L. REv. 59, 61-67, 75-78 (1981); cf. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 74, §§ 4242-45 (describing Pullman and Burford abstention). Courts
seemingly invoke an efficiency rationale in cases where federal courts refuse to exercise
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tice of abstention lends legitimacy to judges who claim common law
power to remand a properly removed case containing only incidental
claims. 95 Moreover, both abstention and the common law power to re-
mand raise issues of jurisdiction, the discretion to decline its exercise,
and the legitimate use of judicial power.
1. The Strict Separation of Powers Critique
In a recent sweeping attack upon the legitimacy of abstention,
Professor Martin Redish argues that the doctrine violates the separa-
tion of powersY6 Both critics of the doctrine and those who favor it, he
contends, are focusing on the wrong branch of government: the judici-
ary. Supporters of abstention argue that the doctrine promotes a wiser
balance of judicial federalism;97 opponents seek to show the superiority
of federal courts over state courts as enforcers of federal rights.9" To
Redish, the arguments should be directed not to the judicial forum but
to the legislative arena: "Judge-made abstention constitutes judicial
jurisdiction in deference to the expertise of a special administrative body whose reme-
dies are still available. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59,
69 (1956) (deferring to the Interstate Commerce Commission's determination of the
rights of the parties).
91 One federal appellate court, in remanding a properly removed incidental claim
after federal law claims had been dismissed, invoked the legitimacy of abstention as a
possible source of the court's authority to remand. This court did not develop this anal-
ysis because it found that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction afforded ample authority.
See In re Romulus Community Schools, 729 F.2d 431, 438-39 (6th Cir. 1984).
98 Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984). Redish reasons:
The principle of separation of powers between the judicial and legislative
branches derives from the fundamental democratic principle of electoral
accountability. The separation-of-powers critique of . . .abstention...
begins with the analysis of the judiciary's proper role in a democratic soci-
ety. The essential element of any democratic society is at least some level
of majoritarian self-determination. In our form of constitutional democ-
racy, we have chosen to vest in a largely unrepresentative judiciary the
power to invalidate laws adopted by a majoritarian legislature when those
laws are deemed to violate constitutional protections. It has never been
suggested, however, that the judiciary may openly' ignore a legislative
judgment on any grounds other than unconstitutionality.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
91 See, e.g., Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation ofJudicial
Power, 27 VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1151 (1974) (An application of the abstention doc-
trine, "which seeks the most efficient and reliable forum for adjudication of federal
interests, is the highest form of 'cooperative judicial federalism.' "); Shapiro, Jurisdic-
tion and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 581 (1985) ("[E]ven in a system that is
essentially 'unitary' in character, experience counsels mutual respect among the arms of
government.").
99 See, e.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1131 (1977)
("the only judicial forums in our system capable of enforcing countermajoritarian
checks in a sustained, effective manner are the federal courts").
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lawmaking of the most sweeping nature."99
Under a separation of powers analysis, the issue is not the desira-
bility of a certain judicial decision to abstain, but whether the judiciary
has the power to decline jurisdiction in the first place.100 Congress has
the authority both to make the basic policy decisions concerning how
the nation is to be governed and to employ the federal judiciary to en-
force the statutory programs it adopts. 1' Absent a finding of unconsti-
tutionality, the judiciary cannot modify or repeal jurisdictional enforce-
ment mechanisms unless Congress has clearly delegated such authority
to it.' 2 "Congress has retained for itself," Redish concludes, "the au-
thority to decide when federal courts should decline to exercise their
jurisdiction."o 3
2. The Jurisdiction and Discretion Approach
In direct response to Professor Redish's rigorous separation of
powers approach, Professor David Shapiro argues that judicial absten-
tion in matters of jurisdiction has "ancient and honorable roots at com-
mon law as well as in equity."'0 4 To Shapiro, "reasoned discretion" is
not only "consistent with the Anglo-American legal tradition" but also
"has much to contribute to the easing of interbranch and intergovern-
mental tensions in our complex system of government."' 0 5 The discre-
tion not to proceed with a case is part of the dynamic operating be-
tween legislative and judicial branches.
Shapiro interprets jurisdictional directives as empowering a federal
court with a "principle of preference," a presumption that it should
decide an action within the scope of the jurisdictional grant.'06 This
"' Redish, supra note 96, at 114. Redish contrasts judge-made abstention with
"statutorily dictated federal court abstention," id. at 81, the network of statutes that
limit the exercise of federal court power to disrupt state proceedings or interfere unduly
with state policies: the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); the Johnson Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982); the statutory branch of the habeas corpus exhaustion re-
quirement, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982); the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982); the Three-Judge Court Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
100 "If Congress intended that the federal courts exercise a particular jurisdiction,
either to achieve substantive legislative ends or to provide a constitutionally-contem-
plated jurisdictional advantage, a court may not, absent constitutional objections, repeal
those jurisdictional grants." Redish, supra note 96, at 77.
101 See id. at 115. "In either repealing or modifying the legislation, the court
would be altering a legislative scheme because of disagreement with the social policy
choices that the scheme manifests." Id. at 77.
102 See id. at 115.
103 Id.
104 Shapiro, supra note 97, at 545.
105 Id.
109 Id. at 575.
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principle of preference, however, will yield when the court determines
that it should not proceed because of factors legitimately within the
judiciary's power to consider.07 The traditional grounds for denying
equitable relief provide a prime example of a federal court's inherent
discretion not to proceed with certain cases within its jurisdiction.'
The principle of preference can yield to nonlegislative determinations of
justiciability' 0 9-standing, ripeness, and mootness. It can likewise yield
to the judicial determination to dismiss a case for forum non con-
veniens." ° Judicial discretion is also involved in determining the scope
of incidental jurisdiction."'
Discretion in matters of jurisdiction, for Shapiro, is not an element
of any congressional grant of jurisdiction, but a function of the need for
case-by-case refinement of broad statutory provisions." 2 Moreover,
courts are especially concerned with questions of jurisdiction "because
they intimately affect the courts' relations with each other as well as
with the other branches of government.""'  Thus, Shapiro concludes,
the exercise of discretion to decline jurisdiction actually protects the
107 Id. at 547, 575 (examples of factors noted by Shapiro include "traditional eq-
uitable principles," "principles of federalism," and "principles of separation of
powers").
108 Id. at 548. Shapiro describes Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its
progeny as heirs to the traditional equitable considerations lead courts to refuse to en-
join proceedings in another tribunal of the same sovereign. See Shapiro, supra note 97,
at 549-50.
109 Shapiro, supra note 97, at 552-55. The requirements of justiciability flow
from article III's "case or controversy" limitation. See id. (discussing U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1). Determination of the suitability of a "case or controversy" is the court's alone
to make. See id. "[T]he power of judicial review upheld in Marbury v. Madison [5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)] must be accompanied by, and indeed is founded upon, a
correlative duty to decide a properly presented case in accordance with the law." Sha-
piro, supra note 97, at 579 (footnote omitted). Some determinations of justiciability are
nonconstitutionally compelled. For example, some standing doctrine is prudential. See,
e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (plaintiff cannot sue upon a genera-
lized grievance).
110 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) ("The principle of
forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."). Judicial
authority to dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens is similar to the
authority some courts claim in order to remand a properly removed case. In both situa-
tions, although the case meet is the provisions of the statute, the court may decide that
it is not the appropriate forum in which to hear the case. Of course, in forum non
conveniens cases, the statutory provision not exercised concerns venue, not jurisdiction.
"I See Shapiro, supra note 97, at 555-57.
112 See id. at 574 ("[T]he question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and
resolve a controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross. And
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separation of powers.""
Under this analysis of discretion, certain judicially-developed rea-
sons to decline jurisdiction are legitimate and do not violate the separa-
tion of powers. Yet this discretion has limits. In order for the principle
of preference to yield in a particular case, the court must provide an
explanation for declining legislatively-granted jurisdiction that is based
on the historical context in which the grant was made or the common
law tradition behind it.1
15
B. Declining Incidental Jurisdiction
and the Limits of Section 1447(c)
1. The Strict Separation of Powers Approach
Promoters of the broad interpretation of Thermtron can find sup-
port in Professor Redish's rigorous separation of powers approach.
Congress passed the removal statutes as part of the enforcement scheme
for its statutory programs. Providing for removal jurisdiction indicates
Congress's policy determination that defendants can choose to litigate
certain cases in a federal forum, as opposed to a state forum. If under
section 1441(b)".6 a defendant can properly remove a case containing
both state law and federal law claims, then the district court to which
such a case is removed cannot remand it. Unless dismissed, the court is
dutybound to hear and decide the entire case.
Furthermore, under this broad interpretation, remand statutes spe-
cifically indicate when judges can deny a federal forum to state court
litigants. The specificity of Congress's provisions for remand belies any
notion that Congress has delegated to the judiciary the authority to de-
cide when to remand properly removed cases.' Discretionary remand
of any properly removed case would counter congressional intent as ex-
pressed in section 1447(c)."' Although it is contrary to judicial con-
114 See id.
"' Id. at 575. Shapiro cites Congress's grant of the Supreme Court's certiorari
jurisdiction as an example of the historical context of the grant rendering the Court's
discretion virtually absolute. See id. at 575-76. Shapiro contrasts the post-Civil War
civil rights jurisdictional grant and remedial provision as an example of a "special ju-
risdictional statute . . . [that] might well tip the scales in favor of little or no discretion.
Id. at 576-77.
110 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
... This position finds support in dictum from Thermtron. "[W]e are not con-
vinced that Congress ever intended to extend carte blanche authority to the district
courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal by remanding cases on grounds
that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by the controlling statute."
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
118 But cf. infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text (discussing § 1441(c) and
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cerns for federalism and comity for a federal court, absent diversity, to
hear a case containing only state law claims, the judiciary cannot sub-
stitute its concerns for Congress's policy determinations." 9 It is for
Congress to determine whether remanding such a properly removed
case is proper. If Congress decides that federal jurisdiction is not appro-
priate in this situation, then Congress should amend the statute.120
2. The Jurisdiction and Discretion Approach
Professor Shapiro's approach results in a different analysis. Using
his terms, sections 1441(b) and 1447(c) represent a principle of prefer-
ence that district courts should hear and decide a properly removed
case. 2 ' If, however, a reason for remand not stated in the statute can
be supported in the historical context in which Congress granted re-
moval and remand jurisdiction, a properly removed case can be re-
manded without exceeding statutory limits. The reason given by the
district judge for remanding Thermtron-his crowded docket-provides
an example of jurisdictional discretion that cannot be supported by leg-
its predecessor statutes, which grant district courts the power to remand incidental
claims after removal).
119 Under Redish's approach, only if a removal provision were unconstitutional
could the judiciary deny the will of Congress. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text. The constitutionality of removal jurisdiction is settled. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
120 The American Law Institute has proposed an amendment to the remand stat-
ute that would grant district courts the power to remand incidental claims:
In any case removed to a district court of the United States . . . in which
claims arising under State law remain pending after disposition of the fed-
eral claim, defense, or counterclaim that is the basis for jurisdiction, the
district court shall have discretion either to adjudicate the remaining State
claims, or, if it finds that determination of such claims in a State court is
in the interest of justice and not prejudicial to the parties, to remand the
case to the State court.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1313(d) (1968). The ALI proposal is part of its comprehen-
sive restatement of removal jurisdiction that also includes permitting removal on the
defendant's pleading of a federal defense. See id. §1312 commentary. Under the current
well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal defense is not sufficient to vest original jurisdic-
tion in a federal court and, thus, cannot support removal. See Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 253 (1908) ("'a suggestion of one party, that the other will or
may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make
the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws'" (quoting Tennessee v.
Union & Planters Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 464 (1894))); see also Comment, Federal Pre-
emption, Removal Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 634, 636-46 (1984) (discussing the application of the well-pleaded complaint rule
in removal jurisdiction). See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
121 This principle is inferred from the statute's command that cases removed "im-
providently and without jurisdiction" shall be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
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islative history. 22 Under Shapiro's case-by-case approach to interpret-
ing jurisdictional grants, however, the determination that the district
judge in Thermtron had violated the statute is limited to the facts of
that case. Whether remanding a different case-one under section
1441(b) that in its present posture contains only state law
claims-would violate section 1447(c) requires further inquiry into the
history of the removal and remand statutes.
C. Recognizing the Judiciary's Common Law Authority
over Incidental Jurisdiction
The separation of powers principle in this context concerns judi-
cial intrusion into the lawmaking function of Congress. Confronted
with a properly removed case containing only state law claims, the
question is whether a court encroaches upon Congress's power to con-
trol what happens to a case after removal by remanding. Under Profes-
sor Redish's approach, the inference can be made from section 1447(c)
that the statute prohibits the remand of any properly removed case.
The court that remands imposes its own determination about what
should happen to a case after proper removal. As with abstention, such
an exercise of discretion conflicts with statutory command.
This view of jurisdictional authority based strictly on statute fails
to account for a federal court's common law authority over incidental
claims. A court determining whether it has jurisdiction to hear an inci-
dental claim along with a federal law claim first decides whether the
state law claim is within the court's "constitutional power." If the fed-
eral law claim is substantial and the claims derive from a "common
nucleus of operative fact," then the incidental claim has crossed the
"first hurdle."12 A court must then determine whether any statute lim-
its its discretionary exercise of incidental jurisdiction. 124 This inquiry,
however, does not assume that a jurisdictional statute restrictively de-
fines all permissible exercises of judicial power.
With its emphasis on judicial discretion, Professor Shapiro's ap-
proach better accommodates questions involving incidental jurisdiction
than does the strict statutory approach. Shapiro would examine the his-
torical context in which Congress enacted section 1447(c) to determine
whether an exercise of jurisdictional discretion is compatible with the
122 The Supreme Court commented: "That justice may move more slowly in some
federal courts than in their state counterparts is not one of the considerations that Con-
gress has permitted the district courts to recognize in passing on remand issues."
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
12' Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978).
124 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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statute. This Comment argues that the Supreme Court will likewise
analyze the history of section 1447(c) to determine whether its purpose
limits a federal court's common law power over incidental state law
claims.
III. CONGRESS'S PURPOSE IN ENACTING REMOVAL JURISDICTION
This Part examines whether Congress, in granting removal juris-
diction, conferred on defendants a right to have the incidental claims of
a case removed from state court decided in federal court. Specifically, it
examines the removal statutes enacted between 1866 and 1887 to deter-
mine whether Congress intended the predecessor to section 1447(c), 2 5
originally enacted in 1887,26 to prevent the remand of incidental
claims. More generally, it asks whether Congress intended a federal
court to treat incidental claims differently in its removal jurisdiction
than in its original jurisdiction.
By enacting section 1331,127 Congress did not confer on litigants a
right to have incidental claims heard in federal court. 2 Because Con-
gress employed similar language in sections 1331 and 1441(a) 29 to
confer on federal courts the power to hear cases "arising under" federal
law, courts explicitly tie the scope of removal jurisdiction to the scope of
original jurisdiction. 1 0 This relationship leads some courts to dispose of
a case under section 1441(a) that contains only state law claims in the
same fashion that it would dispose of a similar case under section
1331.31 In neither context, the argument runs, would a federal court
decide the case. It would either be dismissed or remanded.
Removal jurisdiction, however, serves a different purpose than
does original jurisdiction. Congress granted removal jurisdiction in or-
der to provide a defendant in state court the right to litigate in a federal
121 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
126 See Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Judiciary Act of
1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433; infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
12 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
128 The Supreme Court has said that congressional silence on the question of inci-
dental jurisdiction has left the situation "open for the Court to fashion its own rules
under the general language of Art. III." Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), stated that pendent jurisdiction
is not a party's right, but "a doctrine of discretion." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. But see 28
U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1982) (granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear "a claim of unfair
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, pat-
ent, plant variety protection, or trademark laws" and codifying Hum v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933)).
2 9 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982).
120 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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forum. If Congress intended this right to extend to a defendant's entire
case, including incidental claims, then the removal statutes could be in-
terpreted as establishing a right to have incidental claims adjudicated
by a federal court. The terms of the remand statute would implement
legislative policy.13 2 Section 1447(c) would forbid the remand of a
properly removed case, including a case that contained only state law
claims.13
Determining whether Congress ever intended federal question re-
moval jurisdiction to confer a right to have incidental claims adjudi-
cated is problematic.1 4 As noted, for the most part Congress has been
silent on the issue of state law claims incidental to federal questions.
Moreover, during the period when Congress set the basic structure of
removal jurisdiction-from the Civil War to the Judiciary Act of
1887 1a-concepts of judicial power over incidental claims had not yet
been formed into doctrine. Coherent judicial approaches to incidental
jurisdiction were not identifiable until the early twentieth century and
were not applied with frequency until the adoption of the Federal
Rules in 1938.36 Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins a7 that federal courts must apply state law to state claims has
become a crucial consideration for courts deciding whether to hear a
state law claim. 38 Erie and its progeny sharpen the argument that,
aside from diversity cases, a case containing only state law claims
.32 Congress's authority to enforce its policy concerning the relationship between
federal and state courts would control the force of judicially-defined common law.
133 If Congress intended removal jurisdiction to confer a right to have incidental
claims adjudicated, then, under Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365
(1977), and Aldinger, the court would have to conclude that "'Congress in [that stat-
ute] has ... expressly or by implication negated' the exercise of jurisdiction over the
nonfederal claim." Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18). In this
context, the exercise of jurisdiction that would be negated would be the discretion to
remand a nonfederal claim.
a' One commentator captures this difficulty well:
This quest for congressional intent is largely a quest for implied in-
tent. Congress has expressed its views on the propriety of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction only infrequently. Thus, the major problem for
courts applying Aldinger and Kroger is discovering when implied congres-
sional intent creates a jurisdictional limitation. Courts must ask a most
imponderable question: what would Congress think about an issue to
which it has given no express thought?
Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 168 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1982)); see also
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
's Ch. 373, 24 Stat. 522; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
137 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"' "Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity
and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed read-
ing of applicable law." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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should be decided in state court.1 39
A. Removal Jurisdiction and Incidental Claims
Between the Civil War and 1887
Although Congress has remained silent on the issues of incidental
claims and general federal question jurisdiction, both original and re-
moval, it has addressed the issue of incidental claims and diversity ju-
risdiction in the removal context. The series of diversity removal stat-
utes that Congress passed between the Civil War and 1887 reveal a
general policy regarding federal court adjudication of incidental claims
in removed cases. These statutes, especially the predecessors of section
1441(c), demonstrate Congress's intent not to confer on state court de-
fendants the right to have incidental claims adjudicated by a federal
court after removal. Furthermore, they provide positive evidence of
what Congress might have done had it addressed the issue of federal
question jurisdiction and incidental claims in the removal context.
1. Removal Jurisdiction Through 1875
Congress passed two statutes soon after the end of the Civil War
that foreshadowed the great expansion of federal power in the Judici-
ary Act of 1875.140 The Separable Controversy Act of 1866, 'M the first
predecessor statute to section 1441(c), responded to southern abuse of
the statutory requirements of diversity jurisdiction. Since Strawbridge
v. Curtiss,142 the Supreme Court has interpreted the statute granting
federal courts diversity jurisdiction as requiring complete diversity be-
tween parties to a suit.1 43 Southerners thwarted defendants' efforts to
139 If § 1441(b) were held to establish a right to have incidental claims adjudi-
cated, Erie concerns would not support a federal court's decision to remand a case
containing only state law claims. Federal courts regularly decide state law claims under
their diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982); cf. Meredith v. Winter Ha-
ven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) ("[The difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts
may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient
ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is
properly brought to it for decision.").
140 Ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
141 Separable Controversy Act of 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306. The bar and bench
gave this statute its popular title. The words "separable controversy" do not appear in
the statute. See, e.g., Richard v. National City Bank, 6 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1934) (using the popular title). See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of Fed-
eral Removal Jurisdiction over Separable Controversies Involving Citizens of the
Same State, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 239 (1946) (discussing the early history of the removal
doctrine).
142 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).
143 See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978)
("[§ 1332(a)(1)] and its predecessors have consistently been held to require complete
19871
608 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
remove from state court by joining nominal nondiverse defendants to
the suit.'44 The Separable Controversy Act permitted a defendant to
split causes of action and to remove to federal court that portion of a
case that satisfied the statutory diversity requirement.145 The statute
explicitly mentioned a plaintiff's right to proceed in state court against
the remaining nondiverse defendants.'46
Congress amended the Separable Controversy Act the following
year 1 47 to permit a litigant to remove merely by filing an affidavit
"stating that he has reason to and does believe th*at, from prejudice or
local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such state court
. ,,14sThe Prejudice or Local Influence Act of 1867149 was the first
general removal statute that permitted both plaintiffs and defendants to
remove. It allowed removal when there was "controversy between a
citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another
State . ...-15o Unlike the 1866 Act, the 1867 amendment made no
mention of postremoval state court proceedings. Subsequently, some lit-
igants attempted to remove their entire suits, both federal and state
causes, to federal court. In 1873, the Supreme Court, in The Sewing
Machine Cos. Case, 15 ' ruled against this practice, holding that the
Prejudice or Local Influence Act and the Separable Controversy Act
diversity of citizenship."). Complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement. See
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (upholding
construction of the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982), as requiring only
"minimal diversity," concluding that "Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative
extension of federal jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse par-
ties are not co-citizens").
144 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
145 See Separable Controversy Act of 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306:
[11f the suit is one in which there can be a final determination of the
controversy, so far as it concerns him, without the presence of the other
defendants as parties in the cause, then and in every such case the alien
defendant, or the defendant who is a citizen of a State other than that in
which the suit is brought, may, at any time before the trial or final hear-
ing of the cause, file a petition for the removal of the cause ..
Id., 14 Stat. at 306-07.
'" The statute states:
[Sluch removal of the cause, as against the defendant petitioning therefor,
into the United States court, shall not be deemed to prejudice or take away
the right of the plaintiff to proceed at the same time with the suit in the
state court as against the other defendants, if he shall desire to do so.
Id., 14 Stat. at 307.
147 See Prejudice or Local Influence Act of 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558.
148 Id., 14 Stat. at 559.
149 Ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558.
150 Id. Either a plaintiff or a defendant had been able to remove under jurisdic-
tional provisions governing land title suits involving a title under a grant from a state
other than when the suit was pending. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
151 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553 (1873).
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did not alter the complete diversity requirement. A party could not re-
move an entire suit to federal court without complete diversity.
15 2
Congress reversed Sewing Machine by enacting the Judiciary Act
of 1875. Congress combined the "separable controversy" element of the
1866 Act with the right of either party to remove granted by the
Prejudice or Local Influence Act. The 1875 Act permitted both plain-
tiffs and defendants to remove an entire suit from state court if the real
controversy was between diverse parties.1 5 Like the 1867 Act, the leg-
islation did not include the language from the 1866 Act concerning the
right of a plaintiff to continue litigating in state court against nondi-
verse defendants." 4 The 1875 Act, therefore, granted federal courts re-
moval jurisdiction to adjudicate incidental claims-claims between non-
diverse parties joined with claims that satisfied the complete diversity
requirement.'55 In contrast, a case containing claims between diverse
parties joined with claims between nondiverse parties could not have
been brought in federal court originally. No provision in the 1875 Act
governing original diversity jurisdiction changed the statutory require-
ment of complete diversity.
1H2 The Court recognized that the language describing the diversity of citizenship
needed for removal in the Prejudice and Local Influence Act of 1867 was different from
the language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. See Sewing Machine, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) at 585. And although the 1867 Act extended removal to plaintiffs, the
Court still held that the construction of the 1789 Act in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806), controlled. "Either the non-resident plaintiff or non-resident
defendant may remove the cause under the last-named act, provided that all the plain-
tiffs or all the defendants join in the petition, and all the party [sic] petitioning are non-
residents, as required under the Judiciary Act .... " Sewing Machine, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) at 587.
153 The Act provides, in relevant part:
[Wlhen . . . there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens
of different States, and which can be fully determined as between them,
then either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested
in such controversy may remove said suit into the circuit court of the
United States ....
Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 471.
18 The 1875 Act contained nothing concerning removal on the specific ground of
prejudice or local influence. The Act, however, did not repeal the relevant section of the
recent codification of federal law. See Revised Statutes, ch. 7, § 639, cl. 3, 18 Stat. 114
(1874). The new code took effect June 22, 1874 and, like the 1867 Act, provided for
removal by a plaintiff or defendant who submitted an affidavit stating "prejudice or
local influence." Id., reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441, historical and revision notes
(West 1973).
' The Supreme Court upheld the 1875 removal provision in Barney v. Latham,
103 U.S. 205 (1880). That case involved a land conveyance from a local corporation to
resident and nonresident heirs of the original recipient. The Court concluded that Con-
gress intended the removal of the separable controversy between diverse parties to
transfer the entire suit to federal court. The Court stated: "That such was the intention
of Congress is a proposition which seems too obvious to require enforcement by argu-
ment." Id. at 212.
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That removal jurisdiction after 1875 extended to claims that could
not have been brought in federal court originally should not be inter-
preted to mean that Congress intended courts to treat incidental claims
differently in its removal jurisdiction than in its original jurisdiction.
The 1875 Act also granted the federal courts power to determine
whether any suit in federal court "at any time after such suit has been
brought or removed thereto ... does not really and substantially in-
volve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of [the]
court" and to "dismiss the suit or remand it . . .as justice may re-
quire ... ." Congress clearly contemplated that a federal court's
power to dispose of a case not substantially federal in character was to
be the same in its original or removal jurisdictions.
Congress's effort to expand federal judicial power with the 1875
Act extended beyond diversity jurisdiction. This statute granted federal
courts, for the first significant period of time, original and removal ju-
risdiction over all questions "arising under" federal law. 157 Because
Congress chose to enact general federal question jurisdiction with the
same "arising under" language contained in article III, the 1875 Act
might be read to grant federal courts all the jurisdiction constitutionally
permissible.1 58 Judicial interpretations of the 1875 Act, however, read
... Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added). This
provision is critical because it demonstrates that Congress, even as it granted the
broadest federal jurisdiction in history, intended a federal court to have power to re-
mand a case that was not of substantial federal character. It states in full:
That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or removed from a State
court to a circuit of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of
said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed
thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute
or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that
the parties to said suit have been improperly or collusively made or joined,
either as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of creating a case cogni-
zable or removable under this act, the said circuit court shall proceed no
further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from
which it was removed as justice may require ...but the order of said
circuit dismissing or remanding said cause to the State court shall be re-
viewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal, as the case
may be.
Id.
157 See ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875). See supra note 19 (noting the period
between 1801-02 during which Congress granted and repealed general federal question
jurisdiction).
'18 See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157, 160 & n.22 (1953) (noting legislative history of the 1875 Act and suggesting
that it was meant to confer "the full range of constitutional power"); cf. Pacific R.R.
Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1885) (construing the "arising under" language of
the 1875 Act to have the broad meaning given by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 817-28 (1825)).
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its language more narrowly than that of the Constitution."'
In legislating broad national judicial power, Congress displayed its
distrust of the justice available in state courts. From one perspective,
the 1875 Act was the culmination of Reconstruction. Southern defiance
of national policy had led Congress to redefine federalism to assert na-
tional authority over the South.'"0 From another perspective, the 1875
"" Judicial construction of the Act introduced requirements that limited the scope
of federal question jurisdiction. The first appearance of the substantiality doc-
trine-making the presence of a substantial federal question a prerequisite to lower
federal court jurisdiction-was in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199
(1877). See "One Constitutional Case," supra note 9, at 1433 (arguing that the origin
of the substantial federal question test is statutory and not constitutional); supra note
43 (discussing the substantiality component of federal question incidental jurisdiction).
In Gold-Washing, the Court held that, before federal question jurisdiction can attach, a
court must find "that the suit is one which 'really and substantially involves a dispute
or controversy' as to a right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Con-
stitution, or some law or treaty of the United States." Gold-Washing, 96 U.S. at 203-
04. Although the Court did not explicitly state the source of the substantiality require-
ment, the 1875 Act contained the language "really and substantially involve a dispute
or controversy." Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472. Modern state-
ments of the substantiality requirement have lessened its stricture. See, e.g., Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 70 (1978) (stating the test as
"whether 'the cause of action alleged is so patently without merit as to justify . . . the
court's dismissal for want of jurisdiction.'" (citation omitted)).
Gold-Washing also held that "[b]efore . . .a circuit court can be required to re-
tain a cause under [federal question] jurisdiction, [the federal question] must in some
form appear on the record, by a statement of facts, 'in legal and logical form,' such as is
required in good pleading . . . ." Gold-Washing, 96 U.S. at 203 (citation omitted).
This states the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. See "One Constitutional Case," supra
note 9, at 1436. Had the defendants in Gold-Washing pleaded a substantial federal
question, they would have been permitted to remove. Under the 1875 Act, a defendant
could remove even if the claim "arising under" federal law appeared as a defense in the
answer. See Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at 11; Provident Say. Life Assur-
ance Soc'y v. Ford, 114 U.S. 635, 642 (1885); see also Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 460 (1894) (stating that under the 1875 Act "it was held sufficient
to justify a removal by the defendant that the record at the time of the removal showed
that either party claimed a right under the Constitution or laws of the United States").
The appearance of a federal defense would not have been sufficient to confer original
jurisdiction. See Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888) (construing the 1875
Act: "Where. . .the original jurisdiction. . . is invoked upon the sole ground that the
determination of the suit depends upon some question of a Federal nature, it must
appear, at the outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party suing, that the suit is
of that character . . . ."). It was not until the Court interpreted the Judiciary Act of
1887 that removal was held not to attach unless a federal claim appeared on the face of
a plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint. See Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. at 462
(construing the 1887 removal statute as "limiting the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of
the United States . . .to such suits as might have been brought in that court by the
plaintiff . . . ."); id. at 469 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the opinion of the
Court was an "erroneous interpretation of the statute" and that it was "too narrow");
see also supra note 120 (discussing the ALI's proposed amendment to the removal
statute that would permit removal upon defendant's pleading of a federal defense).
160 See S. KUTLER, supra note 19, at 145-46; Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Fed-
eral Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 333, 338-42 (1969). The
passage of civil rights statutes to enforce the federally-guaranteed rights of the thir-
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Act demonstrated Congress's concern for the needs of the national busi-
ness enterprises that emerged during this period."' 1 Some commentators
have suggested that the real purpose behind the 1875 Act was to rem-
edy the increasing number of attacks on railroad interests in state
courts.' 6 2 Whatever the mix of motives, Congress in 1875 struck a fun-
damentally new balance between state and federal courts. Even at this
high point of federal jurisdiction, however, a litigant who removed a
case to federal court could not claim a right to have incidental claims
decided there.
2. The Judiciary Act of 1887
By 1887, the nationalism of Reconstruction had completely re-
ceded, although railroads were still frequent defendants in state court
suits."1 Congress reversed its course and restricted access to federal
court with the Judiciary Act of 1887.14 The Act limited the availabil-
ity of removal to state court defendants and raised the amount in con-
troversy requirement from $500 to $2000.165
The 1887 Act did, however, retain elements of the federal jurisdic-
tional expansion of the post-Civil War period. It retained the "separa-
ble controversy" provision that had first appeared in the 1866 Act, in-
cluding the expanded coverage of incidental claims that the 1875 Act
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments also greatly expanded federal judicial
power. See generally Developments in the Law, "Section 1983 and Federalism," 90
HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1141-56 (1977) (outlining the development of the civil rights
laws).
161 During the floor debate concerning amendments to this legislation, Senator
Matt Carpenter commented on the national character of commerce and the fact that
since 1789 the American people had "become totally changed in their methods of doing
business . . . ." 2 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874).
162 See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
64-65 (1928). Corporations indeed took advantage of removal provisions. See, e.g., Pa-
cific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. at 11 (suit by federally chartered corporation re-
movable "on the ground that such suits are suits 'arising under the laws of the United
States' "); Barney v. Latham, 103 U.S. 205, 212 (1880) (corporation seeking to remove;
constitutionality of 1875 separable controversy provision upheld). The outcome in the
Pacific Railroad cases permitted railroads to litigate in federal court an enormous
number of cases that traditionally had been decided in state courts. The decision opened
federal courts to a deluge of tort and corporate cases. See S. KUTLER, supra note 19, at
157. Congress has since reversed Pacific Railroad. See 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1982) ("The
district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action by or against any corpora-
tion upon the ground that it was incorporated by or under an Act of Congress, unless
the United States is the owner of more than one-half of its capital stock.").
163 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
164 Ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (1887). To correct stenographic errors in recording the
statute, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433.
165 See Judiciary Act of 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433, 434; Judiciary Act of 1887,
ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, 552-53.
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had established. Although the 1887 provision was limited to defendants,
a litigant who had a separable controversy against a plaintiff of diverse
citizenship could remove the entire case.166 Under both the 1875 and
1887 Acts, a federal court had power to decide incidental claims.
1 67
Congress reemployed the "prejudice or local influence" provision
of the 1867 Act that had been deleted from the broad language of the
1875 Act 6 ' but added a new and significant proviso. After establishing
that local bias would prevent justice in state court, a defendant could
remove the entire suit to federal court. If, however, the court deter-
mined that the bias did not pertain to other defendants, it could in its
discretion remand that part of the case concerning those defendants."6
Furthermore, the statute directed the court to "examine into the truth
166 The 1887 Act did not reinstate the provision from the 1866 Act that had per-
mitted a plaintiff to proceed against nondiverse defendants in state court after defend-
ants of diverse citizenship had removed.
167 As has been noted, the "separable controversy" provision that originated in the
1866 Act, see supra note 141 and accompanying text, was the predecessor to § 1441(c).
The 1948 revision to the judicial code amended the statute to permit removal of a
"separate and independent claim or cause of action." 62 Stat 937, 938. Congress's pur-
pose in the 1948 revision was to abridge the right of removal. See American Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1951); Reviser's Notes, supra note 26, at 5.
Prior to 1948, the separable controversy provision applied only to diversity cases.
The 1948 revision extended the provision to include any separate and independent
claim, thereby raising serious constitutional questions. If a federal law claim is joined
with a separate and independent state law claim, and diversity is absent, a federal court
that adjudicates the state law claim would seem to transgress the boundary of article III
that delineates permissible exercises of judicial power. See United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also Cohen, Problems in the Removal of a "Sep-
arate and Independent Claim or Cause of Action", 46 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1961)
(questioning the constitutionality of removing a "separate and independent" claim
along with an otherwise removable federal question).
166 This provision remained in the removal statute until the 1948 revision to the
judicial code. The Reviser's Notes to the 1948 revision explained why Congress dis-
carded the "prejudice or local influence" language:
These provisions, born of the bitter sectional feeling engendered by the
Civil War and the Reconstruction period, have no place in the jurispru-
dence of a nation since united by three wars against foreign powers. In-
deed, the practice of removal for prejudice or local influence has not been
employed much in recent years.
Reviser's Notes, supra note 26, at 5. After the 1948 revision, therefore, any argument
that Congress granted defendants the right to have state law claims of a case removed
from state court adjudicated along with federal law claims by a federal court in order to
avoid the bias of state court is untenable.
16' The Judiciary Act of 1888 provided:
[Ilf it further appear that said suit can be fully and justly determined as to
the other defendants in the State court, without being affected by such
prejudice or local influence, and that no party to the suit will be
prejudiced by a separation of the parties, said circuit court may direct the
suit to be remanded, so far as relates to such other defendants ...
Id., 25 Stat. at 435.
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of said affidavit . . . and, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of
said court that said party will not be able to obtain justice in such State
court, it shall cause the same to be remanded thereto."' 170 By couching
broad discretion in obligatory language, Congress in effect created a
scheme whereby the judiciary did not have to hear any cases removed
under the prejudice or local influence provision. Finally, the 1887 Act
included a provision that directed a federal court to remand any "im-
properly removed" case.171 Congress directed that remands be "imme-
diately carried into execution" and forbade appellate review, either by
appeal or extraordinary writ. 72
3. Congress's Purpose in Providing Removal Did Not Include
Jurisdiction over Incidental Claims
Under the 1887 Act, it was technically possible to have incidental
claims adjudicated after the removal of diverse claims. By contrast, a
federal court exercising original diversity jurisdiction, restricted by the
complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,'73 could not
have heard incidental claims. This potential to have incidental claims
heard after removal should not be understood to embody a congres-
sional policy in 1887 that favored federal court adjudication of removed
incidental claims. Indeed, by instituting additional remand provisions,
Congress demonstrated its concern that removal jurisdiction not usurp
the traditional role of state courts. The structure of removal jurisdiction
established in 1887 reaffirmed Congress's pre-Reconstruction policy
that, absent complete diversity, state law claims should be decided in
state court.7 4
The second remand provision in the 1887 statute-mandating that
a case found to be improperly removed be remanded-marks the first
170 Id. (emphasis added).
171 This statute marks the first appearance of the provision that is currently codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d):
Whenever any cause shall be removed from any State court into any cir-
cuit court of the United States, and the circuit court shall decide that the
cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded to the
State court from whence it came, such remand shall be immediately car-
ried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error . . . shall be allowed.
Judiciary Act of 1887, 24 Stat. at 553. The prohibition of appellate review repealed
§ 5 of the 1875 Act, which had expressly provided for review of remand orders. See
supra note 156.
172 24 Stat. at 553.
17 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
174 Cf 1A J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, supra note 10, 0.156[1] (discussing the
Judiciary Act of 1887's restriction of removal jurisdiction).
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appearance of what is now section 1447(c).1 5 This provision should be
interpreted in the context of a statute that limited the availability of
removal.1 76 Congress directed that cases improperly removed be re-
manded in order to ensure that only cases substantially within the lim-
ited jurisdiction of federal courts could properly be removed. The provi-
sion should not be interpreted as limiting remand to cases improperly
removed in order to preserve a defendant's right to have properly re-
moved incidental claims adjudicated in federal court. Indeed, a district
judge confronted with a properly removed case under the 1887 Act
that, after federal law claims had been dismissed, contained only inci-
dental claims might well have decided that the case had become "im-
properly removed. 177 Nothing would have restrained the judge from
remanding such a case. Under the 1887 Act,1"8 unlike the 1875 Act,
179
the remand order would have been unreviewable, either by appeal or
extraordinary writ18
175 See supra note 171 for the text of the 1887 Act.
178 In Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941), the Supreme
Court analyzed the implications of the revision of the 1875 Act by the 1887 Act. It
concluded:
Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congres-
sional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal,
but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction
of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legisla-
tion. The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide
for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted
only by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of
the Constitution. "Due regard for the rightful independence of state gov-
ernments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupu-
lously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute
has defined."
Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).
177 There is a similar modern response to the conclusion that § 1447(c) forbids the
remand of any properly removed case. Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides for the relation back of amendments to the time of the pleading. An
amendment deleting all federal claims would arise out of the "conduct, transaction, or
occurrence" set forth in the original pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). As a result of the
legal fiction of an amendment relating back to the pleadings, no federal claims would
appear on the face of the pleading at the time of removal. The removal to federal court
would thus have been "without jurisdiction," § 1447(c), and the court would be
obliged to remand the case. See id.
A rejoinder to this argument, albeit a formalistic one, is to point to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(d) (1982), under which the defendant might then be liable to "pay all costs and
disbursements incurred by reason of the removal proceedings should it be determined
that the case was not removable or was improperly removed."
178 See supra note 171 for the relevant text of the 1887 Act.
19 See supra note 156 for the relevant text of the 1875 Act.
180 In United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742 (1946), the Supreme Court stated:
Congress, by the adoption of these provisions, . . . established the policy
of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed
cause by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district
1987]
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Ultimately, the most probative evidence of the intended scope of
section 1447(c) is found in the history of section 1441(c). 18 ' In defining
federal jurisdiction over incidental claims in the diversity context, Con-
gress has consistently stated that a federal court, in its discretion, may
remand incidental state law claims. This discretion was provided even
in 1875, when Congress implemented the broadest federal jurisdictional
scheme in history.18 2 Had Congress ever addressed the problem of fed-
eral question jurisdiction and incidental claims in the removal context,
section 1441(c) strongly suggests that Congress would have similarly
provided district courts the power to remand, in their discretion, state
law claims incidental to federal questions.
IV. A FEDERAL COURT'S COMMON LAW AUTHORITY INCLUDES
THE POWER TO REMAND
The Supreme Court, ruling on a petition for mandamus, will de-
cide whether a federal court has power to remand a properly removed
case that in its present posture contains only incidental claims. In so
ruling, this Comment argues that the Court will determine whether
section 1447(c)I 83 limits the exercise of common law jurisdiction over
incidental claims removed from state court." 4 This Part first examines
the posture in which this issue is presented and the significance of it
being decided on a petition for mandamus. It concludes that, because
section 1447(c) does not govern the remand of incidental claims, the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus should not lie to compel a district
court to exercise its remand power by the terms of the statute. It then
looks to some issues involved in exercising judicial discretion over inci-
dental claims in the removal context.
court to which the cause is removed. This was accomplished by denying
any form of review of an order of remand .
Id. at 751.
181 See supra note 12 for the text of § 1441(c).
182 See supra note 156 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 153-59 and
accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the Judiciary Act of 1875).
183 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
184 This Comment argues that the petition for mandamus at issue in Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1046
(3d Cir. Aug. 29, 1986), granting mandamus in Boyle v. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648
F. Supp. 1318 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and reh'g granted, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 1986), aff'd by an equally di-
vided court, No. 85-3619, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 1986) (en banc), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1283 (1987), discussed supra note 14, will be decided in line with United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976),
and Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). See supra notes 40-
69 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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A. Reviewing a Remand Order on a Petition for Mandamus
Before Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,'85 review of
remand orders, either by appeal or extraordinary writ, had been
thought to be forbidden under section 1447(d).1 18 In Thermtron, how-
ever, the Court reasoned that mandamus was not barred because sec-
tions 1447(c) and 1447(d) were to be construed together. 18 7 Thus, the
prohibition of appellate review in section 1447(d) operates only when
the stated reason for remand is that the case was "removed improvi-
dently and without jurisdiction."' 88 Because the district judge in
Thermtron remanded for reasons not stated in section 1447(c), the bar
of section 1447(d) had no effect.' 89 Mandamus would lie "to prevent
nullification of the removal statutes by remand orders resting on
grounds having no warrant in the law."' 90
To those who view the jurisdictional authority of lower federal
courts as based strictly on statute, the Thermtron Court's interpretation
of section 1447(c) expanded the scope of a federal court's duty under
the removal and remand statutes. Because proper removal under section
1441(b) 1' vests jurisdiction over both the federal and incidental claims
of a case, they reason, section 1447(c) controls the disposition of a prop-
erly removed case's incidental claims. Discretionary remand, even of a
case that contains only an incidental claim, violates section 1447(c).
Mandamus, therefore, should compel the district court to vacate its re-
mand order. This reasoning not only confuses statutorily-defined juris-
diction with a court's residual power under article III to dispose of
incidental claims, but it also fails to account for the traditional standard
for granting petitions for mandamus and the extraordinary reasons why
that standard was met in Thermtron.
185 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
186 "An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1982); see supra
note 180 and accompanying text.
817 See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 345.
188 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982).
8I See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351.
10 Id. at 353. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that this interpretation was at
odds with Congress's purpose:
If anything is clear from the history of the prohibition against review, it is
that Congress decided that potential errors in individual cases did not jus-
tify permitting litigants to challenge remand orders. To carry out its policy
of avoiding further interruption of the litigation of removed causes, prop-
erly begun in state courts, Congress decided to place final responsibility
for implementation of its removal scheme with the district courts. It is not
for this Court to strike that balance anew.
Id. at 360-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
191 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
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1. The Standard for Granting a Writ of Mandamus
Traditionally, the writ of mandamus has been used in the federal
courts "to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to
do so." ''12 Mandamus is granted only in extraordinary situations. The
Supreme Court has stated that "only exceptional circumstances
amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power' will justify the invocation
of this extraordinary remedy."' 93 The writ, for example, has been in-
voked when a district judge abused his discretion under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by repeatedly referring cases to a master im-
properly.' Finally, the party seeking mandamus has "the burden of
showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and
indisputable.' -195
2. Applying the Standard to Remand Orders
In Thermtron, the statutory requirements for subject matter juris-
diction had been met: the parties were citizens of different states, and
the claim exceeded $10,000. The district judge had no authority to con-
sider whether, because of his crowded docket, state court would be a
better forum for the case. Nor could the judge claim that his reason for
remanding was within the court's residual power to fashion common
law exceptions. 9 The district judge's order to remand exceeded the
192 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). Because an order
remanding a removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable on appeal,
"'[t]he remedy in such a case is by mandamus to compel action, and not by writ of
error to review what has been done.'" Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 353 (quoting Railroad
Co. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507, 508 (1874)). Under the All Writs Act "[t]he
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs neces-
sary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). In In re Winn, 213 U.S. 458
(1909), the Supreme Court responded to an argument "that mandamus will not lie to
control the judgment or judicial discretion of the court to which the writ is proposed to
be directed" by stating that the assertion was "true where the judgment or judicial
discretion is within the limits of jurisdiction, but not otherwise." Id. at 467-68.
19. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines,
Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)); see also Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S.
258, 259 (1947) (the nature of the mandamus remedy is "drastic and extraordinary").
194 See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957). Likewise, in
Thermtron, there was evidence that the district judge had repeatedly remanded diver-
sity cases properly removed to his court. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 341 n.4.
19 Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) (quoting
United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899)).
196 But cf. Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976) (fashioning a common law exception to the duty to exercise statutorily-conferred
jurisdiction by permitting abstention for reasons of" '[w]ise judicial administration, giv-
ing regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litiga-
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court's statutorily-defined power. The defendant's right to have a fed-
eral court adjudicate the case after removal was "clear and indisputa-
ble." Mandamus was an appropriate remedy to enforce this right.
Properly removed incidental claims present an altogether different
situation. Even if one subscribes to the broad interpretation of Therm-
tron and concludes that the remand of any properly removed case vio-
lates a strict reading of section 1447(c), it is questionable whether the
remand of a case that contains only an incidental claim gives rise to a
"judicial 'usurpation of power.' """ The duty of a federal court to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over such a case should hardly be considered "clear
and indisputable." Absent diversity of citizenship, a federal court
should have virtually no interest in a case that contains only a state law
claim."9 8 But the petition for mandamus in this situation should be de-
nied, however, not only because of the extraordinary nature of the rem-
edy. Mandamus should not lie because a judge's discretionary remand
of an incidental claim does not violate section 1447(c).
Only if Congress intended section 1447(c) to forbid the remand of
any case properly within a court's removal jurisdiction would the re-
mand of a properly removed case that in its present posture contains
only an incidental claim would violate the statute. Although this inter-
pretation can be inferred from the provision that cases "without juris-
diction" shall be remanded, the history of removal jurisdiction indicates
that the only cases that Congress intended to protect from remand were
those that fell within the federal courts' limited statutory jurisdiction.
Any claimed right to have an incidental claim adjudicated after removal
is untenable. Moreover, evidence of the scope that Congress intended
section 1447(c) to have is its treatment of incidental claims "seperable"
from federally cognizable claims under the predecessors of section
1441(c). Under these provisions, a federal court, in the exercise of its
discretion, could remand the incidental claims of a properly removed
case. Finally, Congress first enacted the predecessor to section 1447(c)
as part of a statute the purpose of which was to limit the removal juris-
diction of federal courts. It strains the imagination to conclude that
tion.'" (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952))).
197 See Will, 389 U.S. at 95 (quoting De Beers, 325 U.S. at 217).
"I If, after removal, an incidental state law claim has remained pending for a
long time before the court dismisses all federal law claims, the court may have some
interest in deciding the state law claim, especially if the statute of limitations has run
on that claim. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text. A court might also have
interest in deciding a case in which, after the defendant has removed, the plaintiff,
attempting to defeat the defendant's right to a federal forum, has amended her com-
plaint to delete all federal law claims. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
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Congress in 1887 implicitly intended the new remand provision of a
jurisdictional statute, which otherwise limited the availability of the
federal courts, to protect a properly removed indicental claim from re-
mand. Section 1447(c) should not be interpreted to govern a court's
power to remand incidental claims.
An order remanding a properly removed incidental claim, like the
order in Thermtron, is made for reasons not stated in section 1447(c).
Appellate review of such an order, therefore, is not barred by section
1447(d). An order remanding incidental claims, however, in contrast to
the order in Thermtron, rests on legitimate grounds. Mandamus was
appropriate in Thermtron because the judge had no authority to con-
sider his crowded docket in deciding whether to remand. But because
section 1447(c) does not "'expressly or by implication negate[]' the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim," ' under the authority
defined in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,200 the court can exercise its
incidental jurisdiction and, in its discretion, remand a properly removed
case that contains only an incidental claim.
B. The Justifications for Incidental Jurisdiction Support
Discretionary Remand of Incidental Claims in Certain Cases
Gibbs identifies when a federal court may properly exercise its
common law power under article III to adjudicate state law claims.
"[C]onsiderations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to liti-
gants" justify a federal court's incidental jurisdiction over state law
claims. 201 The first two factors relate to the exercise of incidental juris-
diction in the removal context as much as they relate to incidental juris-
diction in other contexts. Incidental jurisdiction saves the collective judi-
cial resources of state and federal court systems from duplicative
litigation.2 2 A federal court's power to hear incidental claims in any
jurisdictional setting ensures that litigants will not be dissuaded from
pursuing federal law claims in federal court solely because a state
court's general jurisdiction empowers it to hear state and federal claims
together. Without incidental jurisdiction, the usefulness of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure's liberal joinder provisions would be
undercut. 03
1.9 Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1977) (quoting
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
200 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
201 Id. at 726.
202 See Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1044 (1962).
20 See Jurisdiction Primer, supra note 9, at 111.
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A federal court exercising removal jurisdiction, however, must give
special consideration to the third justification for incidental jurisdic-
tion-fairness to litigants. Removal jurisdiction raises difficult issues of
fairness that concern both plaintiffs and defendants.
1. Fairness to Plaintiffs: State Statutes of Limitations
When a federal court exercising original jurisdiction decides not
hear an incidental claim, Gibbs instructs the court to dismiss the claim
without prejudice.20 4 Fairness to the plaintiff dictates that she be af-
forded a chance to relitigate the claim in state court. A federal court can
be no more fair to such a plaintiff. When a plaintiff brings an action
that contains both state law and federal law claims against the defend-
ant, she controls the choice of forum. She bears the risk that the federal
court will find her federal law claims to be insubstantial and dismiss
the case. She also bears the risk that, after dismissal; the state law
claims will be time barred in state court.
Considerations of fairness to the plaintiff are different when a fed-
eral court exercises removal jurisdiction. Here, the plaintiff has chosen
to pursue her federal law and state law claims in state court. Once she
pleads a federal law claim, she does not control whether the case will
be litigated in federal court since the defendant will have the right to
remove. If the defendant chooses to remove, it is possible, if not likely,
that the case will remain pending in federal court after the statute of
limitations for bringing the state law claim in state court has passed.2" 5
Assume that after removal the federal court dismisses the federal law
claim and, exercising its discretion under Gibbs, decides not to hear the
state law claim. A federal court without power to remand would dis-
miss the case without prejudice. If the plaintiff is from a state without a
"saving statute, '206 she has lost the right to have her state law claim
204 See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
205 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, No. 85-3619, slip op. at 19, 41 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1046, 1053 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 1986) (Stapleton, J., dissenting)
("Removed cases frequently remain pending in the federal court well past the limita-
tions deadline."), granting mandamus in Boyle y. Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 648 F.
Supp. 1318 (W.D. Pa. 1985), vacated and reh'g granted, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1888 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 1986), affd by an equally di-
vided court, No. 85-3619, slip op. (3d Cir. Nov. 13, 1986) (en banc), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 1283 (1987).
206 See Cohill, slip op. at 19-20, 41 Fair EmpI. Prac. Gas. (BNA) at 1053. Judge
Stapleton referred to state savings statutes, but did not cite any.
Pennsylvania has a "saving statute" that would probably apply to the state law
claims of plaintiffs in Cohill. The state law claims are described supra note 14. The
statute provides in pertinent part:
If a civil action or proceeding is timely commenced and is terminated, a
1987]
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heard in any forum. Because the defendant controls access to federal
court, this bar to relief seems more unfair than when the plaintiff ini-
tially chooses a federal forum for her case. Federal court power to re-
mand in this situation would avoid this unfairness. After remand, irre-
spective of the state's statute of limitations, the state court would be
able to hear the state law claim.
0 7
2. Fairness to Defendants: Avoiding Manipulation
A federal court that considers fairness to the defendant will not
always remand incidental claims after it dismisses all federal law
claims. The rule in Gibbs that, after federal law claims are dismissed,
incidental claims should "[c]ertainly" be dismissed as well,20 8 should be
somewhat modified in the context of removal jurisdiction. With re-
moval, Congress has given a defendant the right to litigate her federal
law claim in federal court. After defendant has invoked her right to
remove, and the district court has exercised its discretion to hear the
case's incidental claims, the court should be more willing to decide inci-
dental claims than it would be in its original jurisdiction. A plaintiff
should not be permitted to jockey the defendant back and forth between
state and federal courts by deleting her federal law claims and moving
party ... may ... commence a new action or proceeding upon the same
cause of action within one year after the termination and any other party
may interpose any defense or claim which might have been interposed in
the original action or proceeding.
42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5535(a)(1) (Purdon 1981). In Deats v. Commercial
Credit Plan Consumer Discount Co., 83 Lackawanna Jurist 221 (1982), plaintiff
brought suit in state court after a timely federal suit had been dismissed without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County,
Pennsylvania, interpreted the statute to allow "a plaintiff a one year period of time
within which to recommence his suit in certain proceedings after a dismissal on
grounds other than the merits of the case." Id. at 223. It stated further that "[it is the
general rule that to fall within the scope of a saving statute, the second action must be
based substantially on the same cause of action and must involve substantially the same
parties." Id. The court held that, "although the federal and state causes of action arise
out of the same transaction, the defendants in the two actions are entirely different,"
id., and, therefore, the statute did not apply. It appears, then, that the statute would
apply when a timely federal suit had been dismissed without prejudice and, within one
year, the plaintiff brought suit in state court against the same defendants for a claim
arising out of the same transaction.
207 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1982) (after remand, "[t]he State court may . . .
proceed with [the] case.") Moreover, even if the statute of limitations does not bar the
plaintiff's claim, she deserves the surer-footed reading of state law available in state
court, especially when the state claim involves unsettled areas of state law. See Naylor
v. Case and McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 563-64 (1978) (exercising abstention
through remand because the state statute at issue had not been construed by the state
court of last resort).
208 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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for remand at strategic moments.2 09
CONCLUSION
Although a federal court exercising original jurisdiction ordinarily
resolves the question of judicial power over an incidental claim on the
pleadings, whether jurisdiction should be exercised is a question that
remains open throughout the litigation. Nothing in the history of re-
moval jurisdiction indicates, explicitly or implicitly, that Congress has
ever intended a federal court to treat incidental claims differently after
they are removed. In the few provisions that pertain to incidental
claims, Congress has consistently stated that a federal court should ex-
ercise jurisdiction over an incidental claim in its discretion. In section
1441(c),210 Congress states that a federal court may remand a properly
removed incidental claim in its discretion. Although this provision his-
torically pertained to diversity jurisdiction and incidental claims in the
removal context, it most likely indicates what Congress would have
done had it addressed the question of federal question jurisdiction and
incidental claims in the removal context. Moreover, when Congress
first enacted general federal question jurisdiction in 1875 21 -a statute
that conferred the broadest federal jurisdiction in history-the removal
provision directed that the propriety of federal jurisdiction was to be
considered throughout the pendency of the suit, not just at the time of
removal. When in 1887212 Congress provided that claims "without ju-
209 Cohill presents this issue. After defendants removed, there was extensive dis-
covery, twice extended at plaintiff's request. Only then did plaintiffs discover that their
federal law claim was legally defective and moved to remand. See Petition for Writ of
Mandamus at 4-5, Cohill, No. 85-3619, slip op., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1046 (3d Cir. Aug. 29, 1986). Defendants have suggested that the amendment was
sought because the case was ripe for summary judgment or trial. See Cohill, slip op. at
14, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1051.
A number of decisions recognize the unfairness of permitting a plaintiff to defeat a
defendant's right to a federal forum. See Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross, 605
F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[a] subsequent amendment to the complaint after re-
moval designed to eliminate the federal claim will not defeat federal jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 444. U.S. 1077 (1980); In re Greyhound Lines, Inc., 598 F.2d 883, 884 & n.1
(5th Cir. 1979) ("plaintiff cannot precipitate a remand of the action by amending com-
plaint to eliminate federal claim," especially when the plaintiff's actions are motivated
by voluntary tactical decisions); see also Barrett v. McDonald's, 419 F. Supp. 792, 793
(W.D. Okla. 1976) ("Once a case has been properly removed a Plaintiff cannot suc-
cessfully do anything to defeat federal jurisdiction and force a remand"); Jacks v. Tor-
rington Co., 256 F. Supp. 282, 287 (D.S.C. 1966) ("the continued jurisdiction of a
federal court after proper removal will not be allowed to be determined at the whim
and caprice of the plaintiff by manipulation of the Complaint by amendment").
210 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1982).
211 Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
212 Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 522.
19871
624 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
risdiction" shall be remanded, Congress was concerned only with pro-
tecting the limited federal subject matter jurisdiction defined by statute.
Understood in this context, section 1447(c) *a3 should not be interpreted
to limit a federal court's power to dispose of incidental claims.
Because the statute does not limit a federal court's incidental juris-
diction, a court has common law power to remand. A court that exer-
cises this power by remanding a case that in its present posture con-
tains only a properly removed incidental claim does not violate the
separation of powers under the constitution. Common law remand does
not constitute impermissible lawmaking by- the judiciary. Although
without jurisdictional statutes a lower federal court is powerless to hear
cases, once Congress has conferred jurisdiction, a court has residual
power under article III to define the scope of a case that the statute
empowers it to hear. Just as the federal court in its original jurisdiction
has power to dismiss an incidental claim, in its removal jurisdiction it
has power to remand. How the power to remand an incidental claim is
exercised should depend on the equities of each case, a determination
properly left to the discretion of the court.
218 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982).
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